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SOME GLOOMY THOUGHTS CONCERNING
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFF'
There once was a man from Lahore
With abodes in Bombay and Bangor.
When some creditors clawed
At the homestead abroad,
His receiver invoked 304.
A cross-border insolvency implicates, at least temporarily, the legal
systems of two or more nations. In the most common fact pattern, an
insolvency proceeding is commenced in Nation A. The insolvency
representative then attempts to repatriate assets located in Nation B. Other
common interactions include a request for protection or discovery of assets,
avoidance of transfers, dismissal of pending legal proceedings, and recogni-
tion in Nation B of a discharge granted by a court in Nation A.
In a perfect world, administration of the insolvency estate would be
centered in one jurisdiction. That country's law would also govern the
resolution of most of the disputes arising in, or related to, the insolvency
proceeding. In reality, current practice is far from perfect. The universalist
vision prevails only in the most ordinary situations. Territorial resolution
of insolvency issues is far more common whenever there is a significant
difference between the legal rules prevailing in the concerned countries.
In this essay, I: (1) briefly discuss the avenues of cooperation available
when Nation B is the United States; (2) assess the current level of
cooperation with Nation A; and (3) speculate whether the situation is likely
to change in the foreseeable future.
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION
The foreign insolvency representative appointed in Nation A has three
basic options. She may request assistance from a state or federal court,'
commence a normal involuntary bankruptcy in the United States,2 or seek
* Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.
1. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, United States Judicial Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 36
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 729, 730-33 (1987).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (1988).
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an ancillary administration as permitted by § 304.? Section 304(b)
authorizes injunctions against various legal proceedings, repatriation of
assets located in the United States, and "other appropriate relief." Other
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code also help resolve problems arising in
cross-border insolvencies,4 but § 304 has received the most attention from
academic and practitioner commentators. This interest is understandable;
§ 304 is novel. It attracts attention because of its direct application to
cross-border insolvency problems and its suggestion that a cooperative
attitude is appropriate even when § 304 is not invoked. American statutory
law goes further than the law of any other industrialized nation in
authorizing cooperation with foreign insolvency regimes.' Nonetheless, the
current level of cooperation is modest and unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future.6
Historically, bankruptcy in the United States has existed to promote an
equal distribution of assets among creditors and, in some instances, to
discharge obligations.7 The most important measure of cooperation is the
extent of our willingness to turn over American assets for distribution in
accordance with a foreign order of priority. How we honor discharges
granted elsewhere is also a significant measure of whether we are inclined
to cooperate. We usually allow repatriation of assets only when the foreign
distribution scheme resembles our own. As for discharge, there has been
only one significant court decision, and it refuses to recognize the effect of
a foreign reorganization plan.9
Other indications of cooperation are positive. Foreign insolvency
representatives, for example, now have no difficulty in establishing standing
3. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(3) (1988) (foreign bank eligible for bankruptcy); II U.S.C.
§ 305(a)(2), (b) (1988) (foreign proceeding as basis for abstention); II U.S.C. § 306 (1988) (limited
appearance by foreign representative); 28 U.S.C. § 1410 (1988) (venue of foreign proceeding).
5. Section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (applicable in England and Wales) authorizes an
ancillary administration. This authorization does not extend to situations in which the primary
proceeding has been commenced in the United States or other important commercial jurisdictions. See
Gabriel Moss, Administration Orders for Foreign Companies, INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE, Mar. 1993,
at 19.
6. Boshkoff, supra note 1, at 745-47.
7. Bankruptcy policy analysis is becoming much more complicated. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336 (1993).
8. Opinions permitting repatriation of assets or granting other relief often note a similarity
between the American and foreign insolvency regimes. See, e.g., In re Rubin and Halevy, 24 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1365 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (concerning the liquidation of an Israeli reinsurance
company).
9. Overseas Inns S.A.P.A. v. United States, 911 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1990).
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to obtain judicial assistance from American courts.'0 And ineligible
debtors can still be the subject of ancillary proceedings." But no amount
of low-level cooperation can make up for the fact that we are a long way
from conforming to the utopian vision of a universal international
insolvency regime. A moment's reflection will suggest why this is so and
why we should not expect to see any changes soon.
Cross-border insolvency problems have been around for a long time,
2
but they have become prominent and noticeable only during the last two
decades. Section 2a(22) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 conferred ancillary
jurisdiction on courts of bankruptcy "where a bankrupt has been adjudged
bankrupt by a court of competent jurisdiction outside the United States."' 3
There was little reported litigation involving this section and it merited only
a single page of discussion in the 14th edition of Collier.4  While this
subdivision contained a grant of jurisdiction, it offered no suggestions as
to when the exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate. Section 4-103 in the
Bankruptcy Commission's proposal, derived from section 2(a)(22), was
more ambitious." While not explicitly authorizing an ancillary proceed-
ing, it did permit the foreign representative to request judicial assistance
even when there was no pending domestic bankruptcy. This section also
contained a list of factors that were to be considered by the American judge
in fashioning relief. With the addition of "comity," this list now appears
in § 304(c) as follows:
In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section,
the court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and
expeditious administration of such estate, consistent with-
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such
estate;
10. See, e.g., Metropolitan Inv. Corp. v. Buehler, 575 So.2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(extending comity to English administrators ofjetliner lessor's parent corporation, who brought action
ancillary to English insolvency proceeding seeking injunctive relief against lessee's wrongful
withholding of funds received from sublessee).
II. Goerg v. Parungao, 844 F.2d 1562 (11 th Cir. 1988) (regarding the ancillary administration of
the estate of deceased German debtor); In re Rubin and Halevy, 24 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1365
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not a barrier to recognition of
bankruptcy of foreign insurer).
12. For a good discussion of the pre-1979 case law, see Charles D. Booth, A History of the
Transnational Aspects of United States Bankruptcy Law Prior to the Bankruiptcy Reform Act of 1978,
9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (1991).
13. 76 Stat. 570 (1962) (repealed 1979).
14. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 2.79(a) (14th ed. 1974).
15. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 69-71 (1973).
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(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of
such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with
the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns. 16
This recitation of factors is so comprehensive that it is almost meaning-
less as an indication of our desire to cooperate, or not cooperate, when an
insolvency proceeding is commenced elsewhere. It is somewhat like a
budget resolution in favor of deficit reduction that lists every federal
program as a possible source of savings but makes no hard choices.
Procedurally innovative and substantively vacuous, § 304 is more important
for its symbolism than for its substance. 7 Congress' explicit authorization
of ancillary proceedings is at most a restrained endorsement of cooperation,
persuasive only so long as domestic interests are not severely prejudiced."
How soon can we expect the situation to change? The American
experience with bankruptcy suggests that patience is in order. Title 11 of
the United States Code is so firmly a part of the contemporary legal
landscape that we often forget that there was a significant period of time
when we had no federal bankruptcy statute. The short-lived acts of 1800,
1841, and 1867 were all the product of acute domestic financial distress. 9
It took approximately 100 years to develop a consensus in the United States
that one national insolvency regime was preferable to local proceedings.
Today, many bankruptcy practitioners would find it convenient to move
more aggressively toward a universal system of insolvency administration.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988).
17. Section 304 has much in common with § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C.
§ 2-302 (1994). Both sections provide new procedural frameworks for the resolution of important
substantive matters (achieving international insolvency cooperation and regulating unconscionable
bargains, respectively). Both are mainly important because of their general message (cooperation is
good, bargains can be policed). Both fail to provide guidance for changes in substantive law. (UCC
§ 2-302 provides no statutory definition ofunconscionability while § 304(c) contains so many factors
that it is meaningless.) And both provisions have attracted an inordinate amount of academic attention.
Interest in UCC § 2-302 peaked some years ago, and it no longer is a popular topic with law review
writers. Perhaps a similar decline in interest awaits § 304.
18. Occasionally, American courts do not favor American creditors. See, e.g., Brittain v. United
States Lines, 884 F.2d 1566, 1568-69 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to grant relief to creditors seriously
prejudiced by order of foreign court).
19. CHARLES VARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 9 (1935).
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Unfortunately, there is no indication of any broad-based public support for
significant change through statute or treaty. It may take one or more
international financial failures far greater than the collapse of the Maxwell
empire, BCCI, or Olympia and York to convince all interested parties that
something beyond modest unilateral accommodation efforts is in order.2"
Even when the time for further integration of insolvency regimes through
statute or treaty arrives, it will require a formidable effort to achieve
change. Bankruptcy is no longer an arcane comer of the law, ignored by
all but a few. Ever since the battle over bankruptcy court jurisdiction in
the early 1980s, political forces have been evident that make significant
reform very difficult to achieve.2' I suspect that these political impedi-
ments to change will become more powerful in the years ahead. Bankrupt-
cy law has become so important to the national economy that reform no
longer can be left to a few academics and insolvency practitioners. To be
sure, adverse political forces can be overcome. Contemporary disputes
over bankruptcy policy are probably no more substantial than those which
divided agrarian and banking interests in 1898. Even so, it will take a long
time to build the consensus necessary for effective legislative action.
Disputes arising under nonbankruptcy regulatory laws complicate the
process of increasing cooperation between insolvency regimes, particularly
when an American or foreign regulatory statute is given extraterritorial
effect by one jurisdiction. For example, several courts have recently
dismissed pending securities fraud litigation against foreign debtors on the
grounds of comity.22 Some of these decisions have already been criticized
on the ground "that a public policy approach to choice of law questions is
more appropriate than an international comity approach," even when the
20. A messy international bank failure was one of the factors contributing to the adoption of §
304. See Chin Kim & Jimmy C. Smith, International Insolvencies: An English-American Comparison
with an Analysis of Proposed Solutions, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1992) (recounting
the liquidation of Bankhaus I.D. Herstalt K.G.a.A., a West German bank, in which international
creditors flooded the New York state courts seeking to attach the assets held by Chase Manhattan Bank,
Herstalt's principal New York clearing bank).
21. There is no definitive history of the 1978-1984 battle over bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Two
helpful sources are BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, POLITICS AND TEMPORALITY:
AGENDA-SETIrING IN UNITED STATES AND ENGLISH BANKRUPTCY LAW (American Bar Foundation
Working Paper No. 9213), and Vem Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The
Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1985).
22. See Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Lintner Group, 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993); Zeidenberg v. Polly
Peck Int'l, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,779 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Lindner Fund
v. Polly Peck Int'l, 143 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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request for comity comes from a foreign insolvency representative.23 Any
attempt to achieve greater cooperation between insolvency systems will
certainly have to consider the effect of that cooperation upon related
24regulatory statutes, particularly when a statute is ordinarily applied to
activity occurring outside the enacting nation. Indeed, cooperation between
insolvency systems would logically seem to be one of the last steps, rather
than one of the first steps, in the integration and harmonization of
commercial laws. As one observer of events in Europe has commented:
The fundamental problem is that different countries have different social
ambitions for their insolvency laws. The French put great emphasis on
protecting the rights of the workforce, and trying to save their jobs. German
attempts to reform their antiquated laws have foundered, not least because of
a refusal by the government to accept a weakening of deeply entrenched
preferential rights which make almost all cases completely academic for the
ordinary trade creditor. They are trying again. Almost every EC version of
bankruptcy law excludes any concept of discharge, automatic or not, and the
resulting 'clean slate' for the debtor: essentially, you remain bankrupt for life
unless you pay your debts in full. One consequence is that these countries
have far fewer personal insolvencies than the UK.
Any attempt at harmonizing insolvency law strikes at the heart of deep-
seated cultural differences and legal codes founded on quite different
principles. After company and commercial law, property law, contract law
and family law have all been harmonized it might just be possible to get
some broad agreement on what a common European insolvency law might
look like. Pigs might also learn to fly.25
Elsewhere in this issue, Professor Karen Gross suggests that community
issues should be taken into account when bankruptcy occurs.26 Her
position has substantial appeal. However, widespread acceptance of this
view would further increase the possibility of intersystem conflict and
decrease the possibility of significant international cooperation, at least in
23. Lauren D. Rosenthal, Rule lOb-5 and Transnational Bankruptcies: Whose Law Should Apply?,
61 FORDHAM L. REv. S321, S347 (1993).
24. Public policy considerations have been relevant in other bankruptcy comity decisions. See In
re Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, 91 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (interpreting
the effect of a collective bargaining agreement in a cross-border insolvency proceeding); Interpool Ltd.
v. Certain Freights of MN Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373, 377 (D.N.J. 1988), appeal dismissed, 878 F.2d
Ill (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that Australian insolvency law did not provide sufficient due process
protection to American creditors).
25. Harmonizing European Insolvency Laws - A British Perspective, reprinted in WKLY. NEws
AND COMMENT, BANKR. CT. DEC., Dec. 10, 1992, at A3.
26. See Karen Gross, The Need to Take Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An
Essay, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994).
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the near term.
Finally, up to now, all of the commentary on § 304 has focused on the
collapse of multinational business enterprises. This is understandable since
there is only one significant recent case involving an individual debtor."
It is unlikely, however, that meaningful integration of insolvency systems,
either by statute or treaty, can be accomplished without resolving the
impact of integration on individual debtors. Overcoming this obstacle is
likely to be difficult since nations differ substantially in their treatment of
natural persons, both with regard to exemption entitlement and to discharge
of obligation. When the first significant personal cross-border insolvency
receives publicity, we will discover that requests for recognition of foreign
proceedings relating to individuals raise entirely different issues than those
relating to corporations.2"
II. A TEST CASE
The grant of a request for asset repatriation in circumstances potentially
detrimental to American creditors would be a very significant expression
of our willingness to cooperate in the administration of a foreign insolvency
proceeding. In 1992, the Second Circuit had the opportunity to respond
favorably to such a request. The outcome in In re Koreag, Controle et
Revision S.A. 29 demonstrates that this influential Court of Appeals is
presently unsympathetic to the universalist position.
The debtor in Koreag, Mebco, was engaged in currency exchange
transactions with Refco. As part of a planned exchange, Refco deposited
funds in Mebco's New York bank account. These deposits were made after
a Swiss liquidation proceeding had been commenced. Refco was unaware
of this fact. Mebco's liquidator sought a turnover of these postbankruptcy
deposits through a § 304 proceeding. Refco opposed the request, arguing
that it had a prior claim to the deposits as the beneficiary of a constructive
trust. The Second Circuit refused to order an unconditional turnover, an
action which would have permitted the Swiss court to resolve the
27. Goerg v. Parungao, 930 F.2d 1563 (11 th Cir. 1991) (concerning the ancillary administration
of the estate of deceased German debtor).
28. The status of the maritrimonial home (England's version of the homestead) has caused
"enormous problems" in the E.E.C.'s negotiations concerning a bankruptcy treaty. John D. Honsberger,
The Negotiation of a Bankruptci' Treat,, in MERIDETH MEMORIAL LECTURES 303 (Faculty of Law,
McGill University 1985). See also Roy Goode, Reflections on the Harmonization of Commercial Law,
in COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 16 (Ross Cranston
& Roy Goode eds., 1993).
29. 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992).
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constructive trust dispute by applying either Swiss or New York law.3"
It also refused to apply Swiss law itself.3' Instead, it remanded the case
with instructions that the trial court determine whether Refco had a valid
claim to the deposits under New York law as the beneficiary of a
constructive trust. There is very strong language in the opinion favoring
application of American law to resolve creditor claims before any
repatriation of assets occurs.
Property interests have an independent legal source, antecedent to the
distributive rules of bankruptcy administration, that determines in the first
instance the interests of claimant parties in particular property. It logically
follows that before a particular property may be turned over pursuant to §
304(b)(2), a bankruptcy court should apply local law to determine whether
the debtor has a valid ownership interest in that property when the issue is
properly posed by an adverse claimant.32
The use of equitable concepts such as the constructive trust to reorder
distribution priorities is problematic even in ordinary domestic proceedings.
Equity's devotion to bilateral fairness undercuts the egalitarianism of
bankruptcy. 33 The conflict between these competing concepts of fairness
becomes even more intense in international insolvencies when chauvinism
increases the temptation to employ equitable principles in the protection of
domestic interests.
There is, of course, no way to avoid this conflict. And no one can
guarantee that a foreign tribunal will be any less chauvinistic than an
American court. One must simply decide whether the gains to be achieved
through a unitary administration abroad are greater than the risk of a
possibly biased decision adverse to American interests.34 The answer in
Koreag is clear. Cooperation is not valued as highly as the protection of
American creditors.
30. Id. at 349.
31. Id. at35l.
32. Id. at 348.
33. The conflict between the constructive trust and bankruptcy distribution rules is well
documented in Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Banknrptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 297.
Recently, the Sixth Circuit, in a very important opinion, criticized equitable constructive trust principles
and refused to apply them to resolve a bankruptcy dispute. See XL/Datacomp. v. Wilson (In re Omegas
Group, Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994).
34. The best statement of arguments in favor of universalism is found in Jay L. Westbrook, Theory
and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice ofLaw and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457,
464-71 (1991).
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III. WHAT NEXT?
The current modest level of cooperation is likely to continue for a long
time unless there is a revival of interest in reciprocity as a condition for
cooperation with a foreign insolvency regime. In recent years, courts have
ignored Hilton v. Guyot,3s the Supreme Court decision that first an-
nounced the reciprocity requirement, or have assumed compliance absent
proof that reciprocity does not exist.36 Now, the Third Circuit appears
ready to revive this requirement in litigation related to a Dutch insolvency
proceeding.37 Reintroduction of a strictly enforced reciprocity requirement
will sharply diminish cooperation with other insolvency regimes, particular-
ly the United Kingdom.38  This diminished cooperation in turn, may
precipitate the type of business crisis needed to muster support for a
fundamental change in the way we deal with cross-border insolvency
problems. Absent such a crisis, the current fragmented, ad hoc approach
will continue even though we can agree with the following observation by
John Lowell:
It is obvious that, in the present state of commerce and of communication,
it would be better in nine cases out of ten that all settlements of insolvent
debtors with their creditors should be made in a single proceeding, and
generally at a single place; better for the creditors, who would thus share
alike, and better for the debtor, because all his creditors would be equally
bound by his discharge.
These remarks appeared in Volume 1 of the Harvard Law Review.39
Not much has changed in the last 106 years!
IV. A SOMEWHAT LESS PESSIMISTIC POSTSCRIPT
The conference draft of my paper ended at this point. I now would like
to add a few less gloomy observations.
There are several possible models for the harmonization of our
35. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
36. See, e.g., Cunard Steamship v. Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
37. See Kilbarr Corp. v. Business Sys., Inc., 990 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1993).
38. The United Kingdom has the misfortune to be firmly on the record as opposed to cooperation
in an important American bankruptcy proceeding. See Felixstowe Dock and Ry. Co. v. U.S. Lines, Inc.
[1989], Q.B. 360. For an optimistic view that the situation is now improving, see Ian F. Fletcher, The
Ascendence of Comit, from the Ashes of Felxstowe Dock, INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 1993, at
10.
39. John Lowell, Conflict ofLaws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 1 HARV. L. REV. 259,
264 (1888).
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insolvency laws." We are currently pursuing an ad hoc approach with
regard to the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral treaties. This method
is probably the best that we can hope for in the foreseeable future. Indeed,
this process may continue for many decades before it produces the
universalist regime espoused by so many experts. Such a lengthy time
frame is daunting. Is there anything the academic community can do to
speed progress? I think there is.
Lack of trust is a serious barrier to meaningful international cooperation
in any area, including insolvency. Trust in a foreign legal regime requires
knowledge of how it functions.4' It is not realistic to expect significant
integration of national insolvency regimes until we have a firm understand-
ing of, and sympathy for, what happens abroad-in England, in Japan, in
Mexico, and elsewhere. Reading translations of foreign laws will not
produce that understanding. More than a mastery of text is required. We
need to know how foreign insolvency regimes actually function. What is
the balance of power between creditors with secured and unsecured claims?
To what extent does the system rely on adjudication for the resolution of
disputes? Does the initial decisionmaker have more or less discretion than
a bankruptcy judge? Are any administrators (public or private) well-
trained, capable, and conscientious. Is the foreign procedure compatible
with our notions of due process? Are creditors offered reasonable
opportunities for oversight of the bankruptcy process? These and many
other questions must be answered before we can make material progress
toward international cooperation.
Expositions by foreign experts, no matter how skillful, are not likely to
be completely satisfactory. Unless the writer is conversant with our
bankruptcy process, she is not likely to concentrate on the aspects of the
foreign system that will be of the most interest to us. 42
40. For an excellent discussion of various approaches to harmonization, see Thomas M. Gaa,
Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Is It Necessary? Is It Possible?, 27
INT'L LAWYER 881 (1993).
41. Treaties appear to be most effective when the signatories share other relationships and arc
located fairly close to each other. The Nordic Bankruptcy Convention is a good example. See Michael
Bogdar, Report for Sweden, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS 109, 117 (Ian
F. Fletcher ed., 1990). For a description of three insolvency treaties, see Michael Prior & Nabarro
Nathanson, Bankruptcy Treaties Past, Present and Future, Their Failures and Successes, In
INSOLVENCY LAW THEORY AND PRACTICE 226 (Harry Rajak ed., 1993).
42. Ian Fletcher's observation concerning the structural and cultural differences between Chapter
11 and Administration Orders, see Ian F. Fletcher, Commentary on Aghion, Hart, andMoore, Improving
Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 879 (1994), is an example of the type of insights we need.
Professor Fletcher, of course, is very familiar with our bankruptcy system. His expertise concerning
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At present, there is hardly any comparative bankruptcy scholarship by
American academics, and practitioner authors tend to concentrate on the
interface of national insolvency systems. Their work is often interesting
and of high quality, but it fails to provide enough information on how
foreign systems handle purely domestic financial failures. American
academics could make a valuable contribution if they were willing to spend
substantial amounts of time, six months or more, living abroad and
studying the actual workings of foreign insolvency systems. The
understanding that results from publication of the insights gained through
this type of field investigation is essential if we hope to achieve greater
harmonization of our bankruptcy laws. And this is the type of project that
academics, free of the need to serve clients each day, are especially
qualified to pursue.
American procedures should not surprise us. He has both studied and taught law in the United States.
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